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Abstract
The size effect and distress risk have both presented puzzles in modern ﬁnance. In this
paper, we build on the methodology of Campbell et al (2008) and Shumway (2001) to
consider potential time variation in pricing behavior of size and distress. We adjust
this methodology in two ways. First, we allow for sample differences, documenting the
importance of regime shifts in the size effect. Second, we use a broader deﬁnition of
distress that focuses on delisting instead of bankruptcy alone, and examine differences
in ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that with our delisting deﬁnition, distressed
ﬁrms do not earn low returns, which reverses the Campbell et al (2008) distress anomaly.
In a linear factor model, the premium for distress risk switches from positive to negative,
and prices out the Fama-French factors during the early part of the sample.
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The recent ﬁnancial crisis and its aftershocks provide a powerful motive to re-examine the
pricing performance of ﬁnancial models. In particular, this performance has been shown
to vary over time. In this paper we focus on two crisis-related factors, size and distress.
The size effect has been linked to ﬁnancial distress by researchers, but the debate has thus
far proved inconclusive. In one of the ﬁrst papers in this debate, Chan and Chen (1991)
document that small ﬁrm portfolios often comprise marginal ﬁrms, whose higher exposure
to distress risk contributes to a higher return. However, these results are challenged by
more recent research ﬁndings. Dichev (1998) uses the Z- and O-Scores of Altman (1968)
and Ohlson (1980) to rank securities into decile portfolios. The author ﬁnds that ﬁrms
with higher bankruptcy risk do not earn higher average returns since 1980. This ﬁnding
contradicts the results of Chan and Chen (1991), casting doubt on whether exposure to
distress risk is systematic. In similar vein, Campbell et al (2008) document that ﬁnancially
distressed stocks deliver anomalously low returns. Therefore, the authors conclude that
bankruptcy risk is unlikely to be a source of the size effect.
1.1 Motivation
One important piece of information is missing in the above debate: the size effect is all
but non-existent during the sample periods of Dichev (1998) and Campbell et al (2008). As
shown in Table 1, from 1980 to 1995 the annualized monthly average of the Fama-French
SMB factor (FF-SMB) is only 0.26%, far below its long term (1926-2009) average of 2.84%.
Even in the slightly longer sample of Campbell et al (2008), from 1981 to 2003,1 the SMB
average is still only 1.31%. When we tighten the deﬁnition of “small" and “big" stocks to
the top and bottom decile size portfolios, the return differential between small and big ﬁrms
becomes larger. Again in Table 1, the second line (Decile SMB) shows a negative size effect
of ¡2.92 for 1980-1995. This is in contrast to the full-sample size effect of 7.06. While
the magnitudes in Table 1 may be economically signiﬁcant, the large standard deviations
indicate that the size effect is statistically insigniﬁcant.
In other literature, the existence of the size effect has been debated by a number of authors.
Horowitz et al. (2000) show that the size effect disappeared during 1980-1996. Given that
1Campbell et al (2008) have bankruptcy data from 1963 to 2004, and analyze the returns on distress risk-
sorted portfolios from 1981 to 2003, see their Table VI on page 2920.
1the size effect mostly stems from small ﬁrms having better performance in January each
year (Keim (1983), Reinganum (1983)), it is easy to exploit this anomaly by purchasing small
stocks in December and reaping the expected beneﬁt a month after (Booth et al. (2000)).
However, as shown in Figure 1, the size effect does not seem to evolve around its mean but
rather shows regime shifts. In particular, the size effect disappears in the 1980s and most
of the 1990s, but re-emerges in recent years. Moreover, the same scenario has happened
before, as small ﬁrms under-performed big ﬁrms during the 1950s, and in the late 1960s to
early 1970s. Thus, according to these preliminary results, the size effect appears to have
the following characteristics: it holds over the long run, and may have shorter-run regime
shifts.
The possibility of these regime shifts does not automatically discredit the size effect as a risk
factor. The market return, for example, also shows shifts in regimes (Chen (2009)). Thus, a
ﬁnding of no relation between distress probability and subsequent realized returns does not
rule out linkages between distress and the size effect.
1.2 Contribution of our Paper
Our research has three main contributions. First, in light of the above considerations, we
re-examine the impact of distress risk with a longer sample period which allows us to dis-
cern regime shifts. We also use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression framework to
investigate risk premia. Second, we use a ﬂexible methodology that allows for regimes, and
therefore we improve on the methodology of existing bankruptcy probability models. Such
existing models (Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), and Campbell et al. (2008))
illustrate that a dynamic logit model usually performs better than the traditional class of
ﬁxed-parameter models based on Z-Score or O-Score. However, Campbell et al. (2008) still
document a discrepancy between the actual and projected probabilities.2 The discrepancy is
not completely random but rather shows a persistent pattern of error. If distress probability
is indeed linked to the size effect, then the existence of periods where size effect is absent
should have an impact on the implied bankruptcy probability. We explore such issues in Sec-
tion 4. Third, we use a more general deﬁnition of distress that accounts for delisting instead
of bankruptcy alone, compare our results to existing work based on much shorter samples.
Finally, using a linear factor framework of the CAPM augmented with distress, we conduct
2See Figure 1 of Campbell et al. (2008).
2asset pricing tests on the subsamples. These tests provide evidence of regime shifts in the
sign of distress risk premia and in the appropriateness of a distress-based factor model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines empirical models for inte-
grating analysis of distress and the size effect. Section 3 discusses our data and comparative
results. Section 4 presents our empirical results on predicting distress and estimating the
price of distress risk with regime shift models. Section 5 concludes.
2 Modelling Distress and Time-Varying Size Effects
2.1 Distress Probability Model
The ﬁrst step of this paper is to examine whether a regime shift of SMB in year t may be
linked to market and accounting data in year t¡1. To accomplish this, we utilize a hazard
model of Shumway (2001). This framework is a preliminary approach designed to give us a
broad indication as to potential links between the size effect and the probability of distress.
If some explanatory variables show different sensitivities during different SMB regimes,
there might be unobserved linkages between distress risk and the size effect. Moreover,
performance of the distress probability model can be evaluated by the difference between
the actual and projected probabilities.3 As an econometrician with full knowledge of the
sample’s SMB regimes, one can tackle this issue in two steps. First, one can account for
regimes in SMB with a dummy variable, which can be used in a logit model to see whether
this enhances predictability. Second, if predictability obtains, one can then implement infor-
mation about the regime in a formal econometric model. We now outline a basic empirical
framework to accomplish these steps.





where Yit is the distress dummy equal to 1 when the ﬁrm i goes bankrupt and 0 otherwise,
and It¡1 represents all information available up to time t¡1. xi,t¡1 includes all accounting
and market information of ﬁrm i at time t¡1 which can predict the bankruptcy event at
3This is in similar spirit to Figure 1 in Campbell et al. (2008).
3time t. We examine whether the distress probability can be improved by including the ex





The dummy variable Dt in equation (2) is generated from the regime of SMB. It can be
derived from monthly SMB with a Markov switching model.4 If the smoothed probability of
the low SMB regime is greater than 0.5 for a particular month, then we categorize SMBt
as falling in this regime. If the majority of months in a year fall ina low SMB regime, then
the dummy variable takes the value 1, and 0 otherwise.
Evidently Dt is not a valid real-time predictor for investors and econometricians, since it
represents information that is unavailable before observing the realization of yit. Therefore,
equation (2) can only suggest which explanatory variables have differential ties to SMB in
different economic regimes. Such results provide information on potential linkages between
distress probability and the size effect, which may then be used to improve predictive power
of the empirical model.
2.2 A Longer run Perspective on Distress Risk and the Size Effect
In order to examine whether distress risk is systematic and related to the size effect, it is
not enough merely to calculate subsequent portfolio returns following evaluation of distress
risk. We have to ﬁrst control for the sample selection problem noted in the Introduction
and in Table 1. We therefore re-examine the association between distress risk and subse-
quent realized returns over a longer period than in existing studies. We track long-term
performance of portfolios sorted on distress risk, from the 1950s to 2009. This alleviates
the sample selection bias problem in Dichev (1998). Subsequently, we examine the relation
between distress and other popular risk factors. Here we use the Fama and MacBeth (1973)
approach described in more detail in Section 4.
Lu (2009) documents that the size premium of small ﬁrms is a short term effect, lasting
only a few years. We use a similar approach to examine the performance of ﬁrms according
to their distress probabilities. This approach can show whether distress risk is a persis-
tent risk source that sticks to a ﬁrm longer than other risk factors. According to Fama and
French (2007), ﬁrms often jump to other size or book-to-market ratio groups, so frequent
4See the appendix for more details of the model and parameter estimation.
4rebalancing can help exploit the excess return which can be retrieved from these two trad-
ing strategies. Our work therefore addresses the interesting question of whether disress
probability exhibits similar behavior.
3 Data and Comparative Results
3.1 Selection of variables
Given the variety of literature on distress, we take some time to explain our decisions on
which variables to include, both regressands and regressors.
Regressands: Deﬁnition of Distress. In order to expand our sample period to ear-
lier years, we have to select a proper regressand yit for distress, because most bankruptcy
databases do not date back before 1980. In the database compiled by Professor Lynn LoP-
ucki of UCLA Law School, a total of 882 ﬁrms have ﬁled for bankruptcy under chapter
7 or chapter 11, from 1980 to March 2010. Other authors who use similar deﬁnitions of
bankruptcy all hand-collect their own data. Shumway (2001) collects data from Wall Street
Journal Index, the Capital Changes Reporter and the Compustat Research File. His sample
period is from 1962 to 1992, with 300 bankruptcies in total. Furthermore, Chava and Jarrow
(2004) analyze the SDC Database and SEC ﬁlings, which in total contain 1461 bankrupt-
cies between 1962 and 1999. Campbell et al. (2008) use the database of Chava and Jarrow
(2004) and add a broader failure indicator which records all the above criteria, along with
ﬁrms being delisted for ﬁnancial reasons.5
In order to capture a broad enough deﬁnition of distress for our larger sample, we use the
approach of Dichev (1998). That is, we choose ﬁrms which have been delisted because of
poor performance as our sample for "failed" ﬁrms. From the view of portfolio management,
a ﬁrm is as good as bankrupt when it has been delisted because of poor performance. We
analyze ﬁrms with CRSP delisting code in the 400 and 500 classes.6
Explanatory variables. Based on previous research, we select the following explanatory
variables which are either market variables or accounting variables.
5In footnote 4 on page 2903 Campbell et al. (2008) mention that typical ﬁnancial reasons to delist a stock
include failure to maintain minimum market capitalization or stock price, ﬁle ﬁnancial statements, or pay
exchange fees. Nonﬁnancial reasons include mergers and minor delays in ﬁling ﬁnancial statements.
6A CRSP delisting code in the 400 class means the ﬁrm is being liquidated. The 500 class indicates the ﬁrm
is being delisted because of poor performance.
51. NI/TA: net income to total assets, a.k.a. return on assets. This variable is used by
Zmijewski (1984) and Shumway (2001). Compustat mnemonics: NI/AT.
2. TL/TA: total liability to total assets. This variable is used by Zmijewski (1984) and
Shumway (2001), and bears a similar meaning to ME/TL in Altman (1968). Compustat
mnemonics: LT/AT.
3. CA/CL: current assets to current liability, also called current ratio. This variable
is used by Zmijewski (1984) to capture short term default probability. Compustat
mnemonics: ACT/LCT.
4. Rsize: the logarithm of each ﬁrm’s size relative to the total size of all ﬁrms at the
same time. Campbell et al. (2008) use a similar measure, with the total size of S&P
500 ﬁrms in the denominator. This variable is derived from the ﬁrm’s June price and
shares outstanding, so we only include ﬁrms with those data in the CRSP tape.
5. ri,t¡1 ¡ rm,t¡1: the return on the ﬁrm in the previous year in excess of the market
return. It is used in Shumway (2001) and Campbell et al. (2008). This is derived from
CRSP.7
6. Sigma: the volatility of the stock return in the previous year. This market data is
used in both Shumway (2001) and Campbell et al. (2008).8
There are other variables that we considered. For example, Campbell et al. (2008) ﬁnd that
the PRICE of a stock is a good indicator whether it is in danger to default. They therefore
winsorize all the prices above $15 and use this as an explanatory variable. Campbell et al.
(2008) also include CASHMTA, the ratio of a company’s cash and short-term assets to
the market value of its assets as a measure of liquidity. One other popular variable is
SALE/TA, which indicates a ﬁrm’s turnover ability. Shumway (2001) also include a ﬁrm’s
age as an independent variable, but he ﬁnds no evidence that it relates to the bankruptcy
probability, so we follow Campbell et al. (2008) and exclude it from our list of candidates.
7If some observations are missing, Shumway (2001) substitutes the missing returns with the market return
and then cumulates monthly returns from that year. However, this approach could be misleading when a ﬁrm
was ﬁrst listed in the last few months of the year. Even if the ﬁrm garners a large excess return, this effect
will be diluted when cumulating monthly returns into annual returns.
8Shumway (2001) regresses each ﬁrm’s monthly return of ﬁrms in the previous year on the monthly return
of the market for the same year, then records the standard deviation of the residual. If a ﬁrm does not have
12 observations for the regression, the bankruptcy event data is dropped from the sample for that year. This
approach reveals the idiosyncratic volatility after adjusting for the market risk. Campbell et al. (2008) use
monthly data to construct their bankruptcy probability model, and use daily stock returns from the previous
3 months to compute return volatility.
6Choice of Methodology for Predicting Distress There are two approaches we could
take to explore our research question, that of Campbell et al (2008) and that of Shumway
(2001). These two models differ mainly in their sampling frequency. Campbell et al. (2008)
use quarterly accounting data along with monthly stock data to construct their explanatory
variables and model. By contrast, Shumway (2001) works with annual accounting data to
predict the probability of bankruptcy of each ﬁrm.
After extensive exploratory work, we opt for the Shumway (2001) model for the following
reasons. First, the model incorporates annual data and thus makes annual predictions of
ﬁnancial failure. This aligns better with the usual practice of annually-rebalanced portfo-
lios. Although Campbell et al. (2008) consider the 12 month horizon of prediction for each
ﬁrm in distress, the estimation of distress probability is contingent on survival up to the
11th month. Second, the quarterly accounting data in COMPUSTAT from early years of the
sample are of very poor quality, which would leave us a much smaller data pool for portfolio
formation in the next stage. Speciﬁcally, with the Campbell et al. (2008) model, there are
fewer than 1,000 ﬁrms per month before 1975, while we have at least 1,000 ﬁrm-years even
a decade earlier (after 1965) with the Shumway (2001) model. Third, quarterly ﬁnancial
statements, although conveying data more frequently than annual reports, still do not relay
important and up-to-date information on a monthly basis. Furthermore, the deﬁnition of
"short-term" in ﬁnancial statements usually has a time span of a year in mind. Therefore
we feel that using annual data as in Shumway (2001) works well for the current research
design.
In light of the above reasons, we estimate the probability of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial distress with
its annual accounting data, which are always at least 6 months leading to the end of June.9
If a ﬁrm gets delisted for a ﬁnancial reason from July of year t to June of year tÅ1, the
distress dummy of this ﬁrm will be assigned to 1 for year t, and 0 otherwise. The market
data of ﬁrms are also used as explanatory variables. Firm size is determined by the market
capitalization in the end of June. We divide it by the sum of the market capitalization of
all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ ﬁrms and then take the natural logarithm. Excess returns
and ﬁrm volatility are all calculated with monthly stock returns a year before the end of
June in year t.
Potential Data Issues A potential challenge in the distress probability model is that
we have to sacriﬁce a lot of observations because some ﬁrms on CRSP tapes do not have
9That is, all the accounting data to be used to predict the ﬁnancial distress event from July of year t to June
of year tÅ1 are known before the end of December of year t¡1).
7corresponding COMPUSTAT data in certain years. The ﬁnancial statements of small ﬁrms
in COMPUSTAT tend to have poorer quality. Therefore it is natural for small ﬁrms to have
lower coverage than large ﬁrms after combining CRSP and Compustat databases, which is
an essential procedure for estimating the dynamic logit model. Figure 2 shows the loss of
observations in the model.
Table 2 compares returns on 10 size portfolios from 1963 to 2009. The portfolios in Panel A
include all available ﬁrms on CRSP tapes with market capitalization in June and share code
of 10 or 11. Panel B shows size portfolios for ﬁrms that are on both CRSP and COMPUSTAT.
These returns are slightly higher than all ﬁrms on CRSP, in the above panel. The overall
pattern is nonetheless very similar. In general, smaller ﬁrms have higher returns during
the course of the past 5 decades.
3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the explanatory variables of all ﬁrms and of ﬁrms
delisted in the following years. The ﬁrst panel shows full-sample results. The second panel
illustrates statistics of ﬁrms delisted in the following year, and the third panel displays
the statistics of healthy ﬁrms. In addition to the variables we used in the Shumway (2001)
model, we include a few others for comparison. CASHTA is the cash and short-term invest-
ment to total assets ratio, and CR is the current ratio, the ratio of current assets and current
liabilities. These two variables are used to capture short-term liquidity of a ﬁrm. MB is the
market-to-book equity ratio of a ﬁrm. CASHTA and MB are also used in Campbell et al.
(2008).10
Most of the minimum and maximum values of the variables are the same across different
panels because we winsorize all variables at 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the impact of ex-
treme values. It is clear that failure ﬁrms have lower proﬁtability (NITA), higher leverage
(TLTA), worse stock performance (ExRET and Sigma), and are smaller (RSize). They
also have poorer liquidity (CR) and lower book-to-market equity ratio (BM). The ratio of
the cash and short-term investments to total assets (CASHTA) is somewhat ambiguous.
However, this is not an issue for our study because this variable, like BM and CR, does not
have good explanatory power.
10Campbell et al. (2008) use CASHMTA, which adjusts the book value of total assets in the denominator
with the market value of equity. In the data description, they deﬁne CASHMTA as “a company’s cash and
short-term assets to the market value of its assets." For this deﬁnition to be feasible, the term short-term
assets must refer to short-term investment.
83.3 Comparative Results
In order to place our approach ﬁrmly in the existing literature, we compare our results to
those of Campbell et al (2008) and Shumway (2001), using our broader deﬁnition of distress
Although we choose the Shumway (2001) model over
Comparison to Campbell et al (2008). We do our estimation with the sample of Camp-
bell et al. (2008) model, using our less restrictive deﬁnition of the dummy variable for ﬁnan-
cial distress. The results are presented in Table 4. Evidently all variables are signiﬁcant
in the logistic regression. The most striking difference between our results and those of
Campbell et al. (2008) is the coefﬁcient of RSize. It is generally believed that smaller ﬁrms,
other things being equal, usually run higher risks of bankruptcy. However, Campbell et al.
(2008) ﬁnd this coefﬁcient to be positive (i.e. bigger ﬁrms have higher distress risk) yet non-
signiﬁcant. The only difference between two datasets is the choice of dependent variable. We
use the broader deﬁnition of ﬁnancial distress as ﬁrms being delisted for liquidations or for
ﬁnancial reasons.11 If a ﬁrm goes bankrupt in a certain month or year, it must get delisted,
but not the other way round. The distressed ﬁrm-month variable in Campbell et al. (2008)
is thus a subset of our data. Our approach may therefore capture more marginal ﬁrms than
they do, which ensures the correct sign of RSize in our logistic regression. Thus, using
our approach yields a reversal of the Campbell et al (2008) anomalously low returns for
distressed stocks.
Comparison to the Shumway (2001) Model. With more observations in recent years
and the inclusion of NASDAQ ﬁrms, our ﬁndings are still very similar to those of Shumway
(2001). We present our comparative results in Table 5. Following Shumway (2001), volatility
Sig2 is the square root of the average of CAPM residuals. Theoretically, this is a good mea-
sure of idiosyncratic risk.12 The results show that all variables are signiﬁcant. Moreover,
all variables have a negative impact on distress risk except for TLTA and Sigma, which is
intuitive. The estimates of TLTA, Sigma, and Rsize are quite close to their counterparts
in the previous Table, which is reassuring.
11These reasons include insufﬁcient number of shareholders or the price fell below acceptable level. In
general, we choose ﬁrms with CRSP delisting code in 400’s and 500’s and assign 1 to the year they are delisted,
and 0 otherwise.
12A potential challenge is that the CAPM beta is calculated with the returns from past 12 months only.
During such a short period of time, the betas might not reveal the market risk each ﬁrm is bearing very well.
The residual of the regression, therefore, consists not only the idiosyncratic risk but also the part of the mis-
measured market risk as well. An alternative, due to Campbell et al, is to take the square root of the average
of sum of squared stock returns, which contains both systematic and idiosyncratic risks. However, these two
measures are strikingly similar, with a correlation higher than 0.90.
94 Empirical Results with SMB Regimes
As shown in the previous section and discussed in the Introduction, the size effect is not
always intact during much of the 1980s and 1990s, although it existed before (Horowitz
et al. (2000)). We therefore use a Markov regime-switching model to capture such shifts
in SMB. In this framework, we work backward to see whether distress probability can be
better evaluated if we factor in regime shifts of SMB. This exercise is valuable because it
may help explain the source of higher returns to small ﬁrms over the long run, discussed in
the Introduction. For example, if distress risk is such a source of the size effect, we could
also see changes in estimated distress probability which stem from the SMB regimes.
In order to implement this insight, we augment the Shumway (2001) model by multiplying
explanatory variables with a dummy variable D, and estimate a logistic regression. This
dummy variable equals 1 if there is a high SMB regime in the predicting period, and 0 oth-
erwise. The results are presented in Table 6. The notation £Dt indicates that a regressor
is multiplied by the SMB dummy variable. Evidently, all cross-product terms have oppo-
site signs from the original variables, and the dummy variable is signiﬁcant with a positive
sign. Leverage (TLTA£Dt) and idiosyncratic risk (Sigma£Dt) do not show signiﬁcant dif-
ferences between different SMB regimes, but the others do. This means the predictability
of ﬁrms being in distress next year is lower for all regressors if the coming year is in the
high SMB regime. For example, the coefﬁcient on excess returns is negative (¡1.27) with-
out the dummy, but switches to positive (0.2624) with the dummy. Since both coefﬁcients
are signiﬁcant, it suggests the importance of accounting for regimes. Consequently, our
framework indicates an important direction for empirical research. In particular, it shows
existence of a time-varying relation between the size effect and distress probability that has
been previously neglected.
4.1 Predicting the Probability of Delisting
It is always a challenge to test predictive power of a distress risk model because the realized
bankruptcies or delistings are small relative to the full sample. One method used by many
studies is to sort observations into different groups according to their corresponding failure
probability, then examine whether the observations of bankrupt ﬁrm-years show up in the
riskier group.
10Table 7 compares the Shumway (2001) logit model and the Shumway model plus an SMB
dummy in the ﬁrst two columns. We form 10 portfolios each year according to the ﬁrm’s
failure probability (the probability it is going to be delisted in the following year). Portfolio
1 consists of the ﬁrms with the highest failure probabilities. Portfolio 10 includes ﬁrms
with the least likelihood to be delisted for ﬁnancial reasons. If the model predicts delisting
properly, we would see failing ﬁrms extensively in the ﬁrst few portfolios. Although the
SMB dummy proves to be signiﬁcant in the logit model estimation, its impact on the failure
probabilities is small. The ﬁrst two columns are essentially the same.
The third column shows portfolios formed by the Z-score of Altman (1968), which has been
used by practitioners to assess credit risks for several decades. Apparently it is out-performed
by the dynamic logit models. The last column modiﬁes the static approach of Altman (1968)
by using the original Z-score variables in a dynamic logit model. The performance is better
than the static Z-score of Altman (1968), but the improvement is limited. Corroborating
the results of Shumway (2001) and Campbell et al. (2008), the inclusion of market data is
essential to the predictability power of the logit model.13
4.2 Double Sorting
In order to implement our model, we construct 25 portfolios by double-sorting ﬁrms ac-
cording to size and failure probability. First we sort ﬁrms into ﬁve size groups according to
market capitalization relative to the NYSE quintile breakpoints. Then we further sort ﬁrms
within each size group to 5 different portfolios based on their failure probabilities. All port-
folios are constructed in June of each year and weighted according to their current market
capitalization.14
Table 8 shows average portfolio returns and standard deviations. In Panel A we ﬁnd a sim-
ilar pattern to that of Campbell et al. (2008), namely, high risk ﬁrms have a lower average
return than low risk ﬁrms after controlling for size. However, the difference (see the row
labeled “High-Low") is far less signiﬁcant than the results of Campbell et al. (2008).
In Panel B and C we separate the portfolio returns according to SMB regimes. In Panel
B we calculate average returns and standard deviation of returns on each portfolio with
13Note that the last two rows illustrate the number of delisting ﬁrms and the total observations. Since the
quality of accounting data in COMPUSTAT is not consistent to all ﬁrms and all variables, the more accounting
variables we include, the more likely we will see missing variables in some observations.
14This is a standard approach, used for example in Table VII of Campbell et al. (2008).
11samples from high SMB years.15 We pay special attention to the largest and smallest size
groups. Large-cap and small-cap ﬁrms all report positive spreads between high risk and low
risk ﬁrms, as theory would predict. The return differential between high and low failure
probability portfolios turns negative like other groups, and of all times when SMB falls in
the low value regime. Most of the risk spreads are statistically insigniﬁcant.
In sum, we ﬁnd as in Campbell et al. (2008) that distressed ﬁrms underperform the market.
However, this result is not statistically signiﬁcant. The size effect is linked to ﬁnancial
distress only through the correlation between ﬁrm size and distress probability.
4.3 Results for Non-Financial vs Financial Firms
In light of recent ﬁnancial events, it is important to understand whether there is a dif-
ferential between ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. We therefore include in our study a
consideration of ﬁnancial versus non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. This is relevant also from a research
perspective, since some researchers do not include ﬁnancial ﬁrms in asset pricing study
because they behave very differently in certain areas. For example, ﬁnancial ﬁrms typi-
cally have higher leverage, and this is usually an important variable in modelling distress
probabilities.
Non-Financial Firms. Table 10 presents summary statistics for all non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms in
our sample. The ﬁrst panel displays results for all ﬁrms. The second panel shows data for
ﬁrms which are in distress at some point in the following year. The third panel reports the
information of ﬁrms that are healthy at least for the following year. The statistics appear
quite close to those of the full sample. We list the statistics of the book-to-market ratio
and the current ratio, but they are not used in the logit model because of low explanatory
power.16
The variable that is most affected by regimes is leverage (TLTA), in terms of standard de-
viation. However, these parameters are of the same sign and similar magnitude as the ones
in the full sample estimation. This corroborates our results for the sample of all ﬁrms. Dur-
ing high SMB regimes, the marginal effect on distress probability is lower for all variables.
TLTA and Sig2 are again not signiﬁcantly different during different regimes.
15The list of high SMB years: 1963-67, 1974-82, 1999-04, for a total of 20 years. There are 26 low SMB
years in our sample. These years are identiﬁed with annual SMB and a Markov regime-switching model,
described in the Appendix.
16The book-to-market ratio has a p-value greater than 0.05 but less than 0.10 for all ﬁrms and non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms.
12Table 9 examines sample variation in distressed ﬁrms, with regard to their respective failure
probability portfolios. Evidently the logit model on either all ﬁrms or only non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms gives very similar results. We also verify again that the explanatory variables used in
Altman (1968)’s Z-score are outperformed by the Shumway (2001) model.
We examine the double-sorting results in Table 12. This table is comparable to Table 8,
except that we exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms (SIC code 6000-6999). To present the signiﬁcance of







In such case, only the risk spreads between the highest and lowest risk quintile portfolios
from the biggest and the smallest size groups are signiﬁcant when SMB falls in the low
regime. In most of the cases the difference is not signiﬁcant, which is contrary to the ﬁndings
of Campbell et al. (2008).
Financial Firms. Table 13 presents results on the Shumway (2001) model for ﬁnancial
ﬁrms. Interestingly, ﬁnancial leverage, or the capital structure, does not statistically affect
the distress probability of the ﬁnancial industry. Other than that, the rest of the explanatory
variables have the same sign as other publicly listing ﬁrms.
Financial ﬁrms are usually assumed to have higher debt/asset ratio than other ﬁrms by
nature. However, we ﬁnd that that healthy ﬁnancial ﬁrms have in fact higher debt/asset
ratio than distressed ﬁrms. The summary statistics of explanatory variables are in Table
14. Distressed ﬁrms comprise 301 ﬁrms, compared to more than 20,000 for healthy ﬁrms.
We also conduct double-sorting for ﬁnancial ﬁrms. The resultant portfolios are in Table 15.
Because the number of ﬁnancial ﬁrms is much lower than the non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, we limit
the number of size portfolios to only 2: big and small size portfolios. For the same reason,
the number of distress probability portfolios is limited to 3 for each size group. We have 6
portfolios in total to keep the number of ﬁrms in each portfolios above 20 most of the time.
The return differential High-Low is statistically insigniﬁcant in both regimes and for the
full sample.
134.4 The Pricing of Distress Risk
We now estimate the price of distress risk. Following the approach of Fama and Macbeth
(1973), we run time-series regressions of 10-by-10 size and distress probability portfolios to





where i Æ 1,...,100 represent different portfolios, ft includes the excess market return (in
CAPM), or excess market return, SMB and HML (in the Fama-French 3 factor model.)
We sort securities in the end of June each year by their respective market capitalization and
distress probability to form 100 portfolios for the test. The ﬁrst step is to divide securities
into 10 size groups according to NYSE breakpoints. We then sort ﬁrms within each size
group with their distress probability and form 10 portfolios with equal number of ﬁrms. In
the second stage we use these loadings to run a cross-sectional regression in each month.
The dependent variable is the realized excess return on 100 test portfolios, and the indepen-




¯ik¸ktÅsit°tÅait i Æ1,...,100 for each t, (4)
For each month we obtain a set of risk prices ¸t and °t. The choice of the distress risk
measure in the cross-sectional regression is the weighted odds ratio of ﬁrms in the portfolio,
log(Pit/(1¡Pit)). We use the market capitalization in the end of each month to construct
the weights. Therefore Pit represents the distress probability of the portfolio.17 We run one
time-series regression for each portfolio.
There are only a few ﬁrms in some portfolios in early years, so we also calculate the risk
loadings with sum beta approach to alleviate the thin-trading problem. That is, we regress











The risk loadings used in equation (4) are the sum of ¯1 and ¯2.
17We use annual accounting data to estimate the distress probability, so Pit of each ﬁrm is unchanged over
the 12 month period from July of year t to June of year tÅ1. The market capitalization of each ﬁrm changes on
the daily basis, so the weight of each ﬁrm (and hence, the distress probability) in the portfolio changes every
month.












The variance of these variables should account for the fact that the time series are serially
correlated, so we estimate Newey and West (1987) standard deviations.
The price of risk estimates are in Table 16. The results from sum beta approach and the
traditional beta approach are very similar. Panel A shows results without an intercept.
Surprisingly, the odds ratio is insigniﬁcant except in the Fama-French 3-factor model. Panel
B shows results with an intercept term. The odds ratio is always unpriced. However, when
the odds ratio is added to the Fama French model, it removes signiﬁcance of the intercept
term. Thus, inclusion of the odds ratio appears to reduce pricing error.1819
GMM Results for Linear Factor Model. Finally, we construct a distress factor based on
portfolio return differentials as in Fama and French (1993). We ﬁrst present correlations,
then analyze risk premia and asset pricing tests in the context of a linear factor model. In
accordance with our reasoning from Section 1, we split the sample into two regimes, which
reﬂect potentially different behavior of the size effect.20
Correlations are displayed in Table 17. Interestingly, our distress factor has a negative cor-
relation with HML over the entire sample, but this masks a switch from positive (0.1632) to
negative (-0.2481) over the two samples. Furthermore, the distress factor’s correlation with
SMB decreases from 0.9140 to 0.7641 over the samples. This provides suggestive evidence
on structural change in the factors, which we explore further below.
Table 18 presents risk premia and formal GMM-based asset pricing tests, in the linear factor
model framework. Let us examine the estimated risk premia in Panel B. In this panel,
the most striking ﬁnding is that for the CAPM-Distress Risk model, the Distress premium
18One major difference between models in Panel A and Panel B is we force the ait term in equation (4) to
absorb all the pricing error, especially those from ®i in equation (3). These unexplained errors can be absorbed
by the intercept term present in Panel B.
19We also try a 60-month rolling window approach to estimate time-series regressions in order to get time-
varying betas. The results are similar to those in the previous Table 16, and available from the authors, upon
request.
20The ﬁrst part of the data is from 1963.7 to 1982.6, and the second is from 1982.7 to 2009.6. This division
reﬂects the periods before and after the size effect was well publicized: a plausible range for this period is from
the time of a primary article on size, Banz (1981), to the time of the June 1983 Journal of Financial Economics
issue devoted to the size effect. It is fair to say that the size effect was made well known in early 1980s, and
some researchers argue that this effect has subsequently disappeared. We considered the years 1981, 1982,
and 1983. We chose 1982 because it features the largest dispersion of SMB returns.
15switches sign from the ﬁrst period (1.26%) to the second period (¡1.17%). A similar result
obtains in the Fama-French model augmented with a Distress factor.
Formal asset pricing tests on the exposure portfolios are presented in Panel C, Model Di-
agnostics. J-stat is the Hansen (1982) test of over-identifying restrictions. HJ Dist is the
distance metric of Hansen and Jagannathan (1997), which measures the maximum annual-
ized pricing error for each model. Large p-values for the J-statistic and HJ distance indicate
that the particular model ﬁts well. The Delta-J test of Newey and West (1987) examines
whether SMB and HML have additional ability to explain asset prices, relative to each al-
ternative model.21 Small p-values for the Delta-J test indicate that addition of SMB and
HML improves model ﬁt. The J-test has large p-values, indicating that we cannot reject any
of the models. Returning to Panel C, the HJ-distance only has large p-values for the early
sample, for each model. This indicates that we can only accept the models during the pe-
riod 1963-1982, or alternatively, after 1982 we cannot accept any of the models considered.
Turning to the Delta-J test, the small p-values in the late sample indicate that SMB and
HML improve the ﬁt of a model of CAPM augmented with Distress. However, for the early
sample, the p-value of 0.07 indicates that Distress is statistically superior to a model with
SMB and HML, at conventional signiﬁcance levels.
To summarize, the distress factor earns a signiﬁcant positive premium only in the ﬁrst part
of the sample. Moreover, the CAPM augmented with the Distress factor can plausibly price
out SMB and HML in the early sample. This is interesting since the early sample is when
SMB was large. Taken together, our results indicate striking differences between the two
sample regimes.
5 Conclusions
The recent ﬁnancial crisis has shown that distress risk is a serious matter in both the ﬁ-
nancial and real economy. In this paper we show that it is important to account for regime
switches in the risk factors. Building on the work of Dichev (1998), Shumway (2001), and
Campbell et al. (2008), we analyze the link between distress and the size effect. We also
account for possible differences between ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Importantly, we
ﬁnd that the distress anomaly of Campbell et al (2008) is removed when we use a broader
deﬁnition of distress, which allows for delisting. We have two additional results. First, we
21For more details on these tests, see Cochrane (2001).
16control for sample selection, documenting the importance of regime shifts in the size effect.
Second, we estimate the premium for distress risk in two ways, using both the odds of dis-
tress and a distress risk factor based on return differentials. In the odds ratio approach, the
price of distress risk is generally not signiﬁcant. In the factor approach, distress risk earns
a signiﬁcant positive premium and can plausibly price out SMB and HML in the ﬁrst part
of the sample.
More broadly, our results indicate instability in the premia for risk factors, as well as
fragility of anomalies related to distress risk. These ﬁndings suggest that the risk of distress
could be proﬁtably modelled in a regime switching framework. Understanding the ramiﬁ-
cations of this more ﬂexible approach to modelling risk premia may be a valuable direction
for future research.
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196 Appendix
6.1 Regime-Switching Model on SMB
We model the expected mean and variance of SMB via a two state Markov-switching model, so the
state variable St, which governs the regime shift, takes a value of 1 or 2. When St Æ 1, (St Æ 2) the
expected mean of SMBt is high (low). The basic model is
yt Æ¹kÅ¾k"t "t » N(0,1). (7)
where yt represents SMBt, ¹k and ¾k are state-dependent mean and standard deviation of SMBt.
k=1 or 2, which identiﬁes the state SMBt is in at time t. The state variable St is assumed to follow
a 2-state ﬁrst-order Markov process with ﬁxed transition probabilities as follows:
p Æ Pr(St Æ1jSt¡1 Æ1)
1¡ p Æ Pr(St Æ2jSt¡1 Æ1)
q Æ Pr(St Æ2jSt¡1 Æ2)
1¡q Æ Pr(St Æ1jSt¡1 Æ2) (8)
The mean and variance of SMB are determined by the current state, and the state variable St is
independent of information beyond one period’s lag. SMBt in each state is assumed to follow the
















ln[Pr(St Æ1)f(ytjSt Æ1)ÅPr(St Æ2)f(ytjSt Æ2)] (9)
We estimate the regime probability Pr(St Æ k) with the recursive representation of Gray (1996):
Pr(St Æ1) Æ (1¡q)
[
f(yt¡1jSt¡1 Æ2)Pr(St¡1 Æ2)





f(yt¡1jSt¡1 Æ1)Pr(St¡1 Æ1)Å f(yt¡1jSt¡1 Æ2)Pr(St¡1 Æ2)
]
(10)
where lowercase p and q are transition probabilities deﬁned in (8) and Pr(St Æ2)Æ1¡Pr(St Æ1).
20Table 1: Return Differentials between Portfolios
of Small and Big ﬁrms
1980-1995 1981-2003 1926-2009
F-F SMB 0.26 1.31 2.84
(8.17) (11.70) (11.56)
Decile SMB ¡2.92 0.87 7.06
(13.38) (17.76) (26.49)
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
21Figure 1: The return differentials and probability of SMB regimes
The ﬁgure shows the difference in returns between the ﬁrst and the 10th decile size portfolios and the
smoothed probability of the high small stock premium regime. Panel A shows the annual portfolio return
difference between small and big stocks. The smoothed inference of the high SMB regime is shown in Panel
B. The shaded area indicates the contraction period during US business cycles.
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
A. Return Diffential of Portfolio 1 over Portfolio 10
B. Smoothed Probability of High SMB regime
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
22Figure 2: Percentage of observations lost in each size portfolio.
The ﬁgure shows the percentage of observations lost in each portfolio after combining CRSP database and the
dynamic logit model, which uses both CRSP and COMPUSTAT data. The denominator is the total number of
ﬁrms of each size portfolio with CRSP data only. Small ﬁrms usually have a higher “missing" rate than large
ﬁrms because the quality of their accounting data is poorer. Size1 means the size portfolio with the largest
ﬁrms, and Size10 is the size portfolio consists of the smallest ﬁrms. Portfolio breakpoints are determined by
all NYSE ﬁrms on CRSP tape according to their June market capitalization (ME). NASDAQ and AMEX ﬁrms
are inserted to each portfolio according to their June ME and the breakpoints.




















23Table 2: Comparison of size portfolio returns between
portfolios sorted with ﬁrms on CRSP tape or ﬁrms on
both CRSP and COMPUSTAT tapes. These data are
reported in monthly frequency
Panel A: All NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ listed Firms
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Size1 0.0083 0.0428 -0.1976 0.1807
Size2 0.0098 0.0467 -0.2246 0.1799
Size3 0.0103 0.0505 -0.2403 0.1903
Size4 0.0111 0.0518 -0.2572 0.2181
Size5 0.0106 0.0531 -0.2621 0.2061
Size6 0.0117 0.0560 -0.2809 0.2524
Size7 0.0117 0.0588 -0.2954 0.2479
Size8 0.0118 0.0601 -0.2889 0.2535
Size9 0.0113 0.0633 -0.3015 0.2843
Size10 0.0120 0.0647 -0.2894 0.2957
Panel B: Firms with Bankruptcy Probability Information
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Size1 0.0084 0.0427 -0.1938 0.1870
Size2 0.0101 0.0466 -0.2189 0.1850
Size3 0.0107 0.0502 -0.2368 0.1973
Size4 0.0111 0.0517 -0.2603 0.2131
Size5 0.0108 0.0528 -0.2585 0.2096
Size6 0.0122 0.0559 -0.2865 0.2551
Size7 0.0122 0.0581 -0.2879 0.2531
Size8 0.0126 0.0599 -0.3004 0.2542
Size9 0.0123 0.0639 -0.3143 0.2963
Size10 0.0131 0.0659 -0.3037 0.3031
24Table 3: Summary statistics of explanatory variables under dif-
ferent distress conditions. All variables are winsorized at 1%
and 99% levels of the full dataset. Here we include CASHTA,
BM, CR, but they are not used in the logit model.
Panel A: All Observations
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
NITA 166434 -0.0053 0.1861 -1.0656 0.2510
TLTA 166434 0.5280 0.2482 0.0499 1.1574
ExRET 166434 1.0200 0.4883 0.1693 3.0682
RSize 166434 -10.6028 2.0015 -14.8387 -5.7508
Sigma 166434 0.1446 0.0910 0.0301 0.5508
CASHTA 165247 0.1479 0.1903 0.0005 0.8741
BM 163317 0.7901 0.7140 -0.7993 3.8470
CR 143388 2.8579 2.8017 0.3252 19.5520
Panel B: Firms in Distress the Following Year
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
NITA 4585 -0.2548 0.3479 -1.0656 0.2510
TLTA 4585 0.6233 0.2872 0.0499 1.1574
ExRET 4585 0.6131 0.4891 0.1693 3.0682
RSize 4585 -13.2283 1.3448 -14.8387 -5.9060
Sigma 4585 0.2491 0.1256 0.0301 0.5508
CASHTA 4585 0.1581 0.2171 0.0005 0.8741
BM 4533 0.7366 1.0193 -0.7993 3.8470
CR 4189 2.2899 3.0047 0.3252 19.5520
Panel C: Firms in Healthy Condition the Following Year
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
NITA 161849 0.0017 0.1743 -1.0656 0.2510
TLTA 161849 0.5253 0.2465 0.0499 1.1574
ExRET 161849 1.0315 0.4833 0.1693 3.0682
RSize 161849 -10.5284 1.9666 -14.8387 -5.7508
Sigma 161849 0.1417 0.0880 0.0301 0.5508
CASHTA 160662 0.1477 0.1894 0.0005 0.8741
BM 158784 0.7916 0.7033 -0.7993 3.8470
CR 139199 2.8750 2.7936 0.3252 19.5520
25Table 4: Results of Campbel et al Model Estimation
Standard Wald
Parameter Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -16.7924 0.3834 1918.6342 <.0001
NIMTAAVG -30.6854 1.2232 629.3002 <.0001
TLMTA 1.5468 0.063 603.2093 <.0001
EXRETAVG -3.5426 0.4749 55.6585 <.0001
Sigma 0.3896 0.0547 50.754 <.0001
RSize -0.7906 0.0288 751.8166 <.0001
CASHMTA -0.8489 0.1834 21.4247 <.0001
MB 0.2414 0.00746 1046.2596 <.0001
PRICE -0.8621 0.0355 590.9697 <.0001
Table 5: Shumway Model with all ﬁrms available
Standard Wald
Parameter Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -13.4489 0.189 5063.4687 <.0001
NITA -1.1662 0.0548 453.1463 <.0001
TLTA 1.5278 0.0603 642.265 <.0001
ExRET -1.1782 0.0435 732.6389 <.0001
Sigma 3.5775 0.1474 588.9153 <.0001
RSize -0.7635 0.0137 3089.7731 <.0001
26Table 6: Shumway Model with SMB dummy.
Standard Wald
Parameter Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -13.8858 0.2493 3102.671 <.0001
Dum 1.0676 0.3853 7.6796 0.0056
NITA -1.2528 0.0681 338.6526 <.0001
TLTA 1.5479 0.0748 428.5006 <.0001
ExRET -1.2726 0.0588 468.8030 <.0001
Sigma 3.7817 0.1955 374.1542 <.0001
RSize -0.802 0.0181 1964.8444 <.0001
NITA £Dt 0.2745 0.1153 5.6698 0.0173
TLTA £Dt -0.0847 0.1274 0.4423 0.5060
ExRET £Dt 0.2624 0.0871 9.0846 0.0026
Sigma £Dt -0.1223 0.3047 0.1613 0.6880
RSize £Dt 0.1025 0.0280 13.3834 0.0003
Table 7: Comparison of different models
Shumway (2001)
Shumway (2001) Logit Model
Port Logit Model w/ SMB Dummy Zscore Altman Logit
1 3055 3049 1316 1728
2 700 709 531 650
3 321 318 354 268
4 155 159 277 184
5 118 119 224 246
6 88 84 178 203
7 66 67 177 133
8 44 42 189 128
9 27 27 243 109
10 11 11 244 84
No. of Delisted ﬁrms 4585 4585 3733 3733
No. of total obs. 166434 166434 124162 124162
27Table 8: Portfolios sorted by size and failure risk
Panel A. Full Sample
Big Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Small
High Risk 0.0076 0.0083 0.0076 0.0083 0.0091
( 0.0565) ( 0.0622) ( 0.0656) ( 0.0752) ( 0.0930)
Failure Prob 2 0.0085 0.0103 0.0109 0.0120 0.0103
( 0.0486) ( 0.0522) ( 0.0541) ( 0.0592) ( 0.0791)
Failure Prob 3 0.0080 0.0102 0.0109 0.0126 0.0111
( 0.0479) ( 0.0482) ( 0.0513) ( 0.0572) ( 0.0701)
Failure Prob 4 0.0074 0.0101 0.0107 0.0129 0.0117
( 0.0452) ( 0.0495) ( 0.0515) ( 0.0564) ( 0.0617)
Low Risk 0.0086 0.0108 0.0121 0.0117 0.0129
( 0.0436) ( 0.0592) ( 0.0619) ( 0.0625) ( 0.0605)
High-Low -0.0011 -0.0025 -0.0045 -0.0034 -0.0038
( 0.0388) ( 0.0432) ( 0.0433) ( 0.0411) ( 0.0557)
Panel B. High SMB regime
Big Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Small
High Risk 0.0087 0.0118 0.0108 0.0154 0.0253
( 0.0558) ( 0.0657) ( 0.0667) ( 0.0786) ( 0.1053)
Failure Prob 2 0.0100 0.0146 0.0167 0.0171 0.0244
( 0.0475) ( 0.0507) ( 0.0528) ( 0.0598) ( 0.0857)
Failure Prob 3 0.0091 0.0132 0.0160 0.0202 0.0234
( 0.0487) ( 0.0476) ( 0.0495) ( 0.0591) ( 0.0743)
Failure Prob 4 0.0049 0.0139 0.0164 0.0190 0.0220
( 0.0483) ( 0.0499) ( 0.0509) ( 0.0579) ( 0.0634)
Low Risk 0.0067 0.0146 0.0171 0.0194 0.0224
( 0.0457) ( 0.0627) ( 0.0631) ( 0.0642) ( 0.0636)
High-Low 0.0020 -0.0028 -0.0063 -0.0040 0.0028
( 0.0433) ( 0.0525) ( 0.0483) ( 0.0458) ( 0.0623)
Panel C. Low SMB regime
Big Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Small
High Risk 0.0067 0.0056 0.0051 0.0029 -0.0033
( 0.0571) ( 0.0593) ( 0.0649) ( 0.0722) ( 0.0803)
Failure Prob 2 0.0073 0.0070 0.0064 0.0080 -0.0005
( 0.0494) ( 0.0531) ( 0.0547) ( 0.0585) ( 0.0720)
Failure Prob 3 0.0072 0.0078 0.0070 0.0067 0.0016
( 0.0474) ( 0.0485) ( 0.0523) ( 0.0551) ( 0.0653)
Failure Prob 4 0.0093 0.0073 0.0063 0.0082 0.0038
( 0.0426) ( 0.0492) ( 0.0516) ( 0.0548) ( 0.0594)
Low Risk 0.0101 0.0079 0.0082 0.0059 0.0056
( 0.0419) ( 0.0564) ( 0.0607) ( 0.0606) ( 0.0571)
High-Low -0.0035 -0.0023 -0.0032 -0.0030 -0.0089
( 0.0349) ( 0.0345) ( 0.0389) ( 0.0372) ( 0.0494)
28Table 9: Comparison of different models.
All Firms Non-Financial Firms
Shumway Shumway Altman Var
Port Logit Model PCT Logit Model PCT Logit Model PCT Zscore PCT
1 3055 66.63 2641 65.88 1639 46.84 1250 35.72
2 700 15.27 654 16.31 598 17.09 529 15.12
3 321 7.00 284 7.08 249 7.12 306 8.75
4 155 3.38 140 3.49 210 6.00 247 7.06
5 118 2.57 106 2.64 192 5.49 214 6.12
6 88 1.92 75 1.87 180 5.14 164 4.69
7 66 1.44 47 1.17 122 3.49 165 4.72
8 44 0.96 30 0.75 124 3.54 178 5.09
9 27 0.59 24 0.60 106 3.03 214 6.12
10 11 0.24 8 0.20 79 2.26 232 6.63
4585 100.00 4009 100.00 3499 100.00 3499 100.00
29Table 10: Summary Statistics of explanatory variables, all non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms
Panel A: All Observations
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
NITA 138745 -0.00893 0.203259 -1.15184 0.254766
TLTA 138745 0.48172 0.22439 0.049534 1.193983
ExRET 138745 1.017521 0.508374 0.162495 3.194179
RSize 138745 -10.4396 1.993704 -14.6836 -5.56507
Sigma 138745 0.15188 0.093112 0.033631 0.571001
CASHTA 137829 0.153786 0.197356 0.00039 0.884473
BM 135808 0.771061 0.724988 -0.88421 3.824365
CR 136385 2.854803 2.725819 0.334666 18.87261
Panel B: Firms in Distress the Following Year
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
NITA 4009 -0.27919 0.369839 -1.15184 0.254766
TLTA 4009 0.615368 0.289817 0.049534 1.193983
ExRET 4009 0.60556 0.494013 0.162495 3.194179
RSize 4009 -13.0629 1.322718 -14.6836 -5.68278
Sigma 4009 0.255185 0.12664 0.033631 0.571001
CASHTA 4009 0.158477 0.218841 0.00039 0.884473
BM 3960 0.707725 1.021368 -0.88421 3.824365
CR 3919 2.236349 2.785974 0.334666 18.87261
Panel C: Firms in Healthy Condition the Following Year
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
NITA 134736 -0.00089 0.190359 -1.15184 0.254766
TLTA 134736 0.477744 0.220914 0.049534 1.193983
ExRET 134736 1.029779 0.503661 0.162495 3.194179
RSize 134736 -10.3615 1.957094 -14.6836 -5.56507
Sigma 134736 0.148806 0.090131 0.033631 0.571001
CASHTA 133820 0.153645 0.196676 0.00039 0.884473
BM 131848 0.772964 0.714105 -0.88421 3.824365
CR 132466 2.8731 2.72189 0.334666 18.87261
30Table 11: Estimation of Shumway model, non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms
Standard Wald
Parameter Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -13.5198 0.2009 4527.704 <.0001
NITA -1.1049 0.0548 406.2917 <.0001
TLTA 1.7502 0.0657 709.1715 <.0001
ExRET -1.12 0.0463 586.115 <.0001
Sigma 3.1596 0.1586 396.785 <.0001
RSize -0.7768 0.0148 2740.053 <.0001
31Table 12: Portfolios sorted by size and failure risk, non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms
Panel A. Full Sample
Big Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5
High Risk 0.0077 0.0081 0.0083 0.0083 0.0094
( 0.0531) ( 0.0639) ( 0.0690) ( 0.0792) ( 0.0938)
Failure Prob 2 0.0084 0.0099 0.0113 0.0121 0.0109
( 0.0464) ( 0.0518) ( 0.0562) ( 0.0640) ( 0.0847)
Failure Prob 3 0.0087 0.0104 0.0106 0.0122 0.0113
( 0.0471) ( 0.0479) ( 0.0529) ( 0.0602) ( 0.0749)
Failure Prob 4 0.0073 0.0099 0.0105 0.0124 0.0121
( 0.0448) ( 0.0527) ( 0.0540) ( 0.0580) ( 0.0664)
Low Risk 0.0087 0.0107 0.0117 0.0118 0.0125
( 0.0448) ( 0.0616) ( 0.0633) ( 0.0646) ( 0.0627)
High-Low -0.0010 -0.0026 -0.0033 -0.0034 -0.0032
( 0.0383) ( 0.0436) ( 0.0431) ( 0.0417) ( 0.0552)
Panel B. High SMB regime
Big Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5
High Risk 0.0091 0.0112 0.0130 0.0160 0.0244
( 0.0574) ( 0.0687) ( 0.0718) ( 0.0851) ( 0.1047)
Failure Prob 2 0.0091 0.0145 0.0168 0.0188 0.0257
( 0.0457) ( 0.0523) ( 0.0560) ( 0.0650) ( 0.0951)
Failure Prob 3 0.0094 0.0133 0.0163 0.0192 0.0239
( 0.0496) ( 0.0483) ( 0.0520) ( 0.0629) ( 0.0809)
Failure Prob 4 0.0039 0.0137 0.0160 0.0189 0.0228
( 0.0479) ( 0.0538) ( 0.0535) ( 0.0593) ( 0.0703)
Low Risk 0.0068 0.0143 0.0163 0.0195 0.0220
( 0.0472) ( 0.0666) ( 0.0641) ( 0.0660) ( 0.0662)
High-Low 0.0024 -0.0031 -0.0033 -0.0035 0.0024
( 0.0455) ( 0.0522) ( 0.0474) ( 0.0470) ( 0.0595)
Panel C. Low SMB regime
Big Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5
High Risk 0.0065 0.0058 0.0048 0.0024 -0.0022
( 0.0495) ( 0.0599) ( 0.0666) ( 0.0740) ( 0.0828)
Failure Prob 2 0.0079 0.0064 0.0071 0.0069 -0.0005
( 0.0471) ( 0.0512) ( 0.0561) ( 0.0628) ( 0.0739)
Failure Prob 3 0.0081 0.0082 0.0061 0.0069 0.0017
( 0.0452) ( 0.0475) ( 0.0533) ( 0.0575) ( 0.0685)
Failure Prob 4 0.0099 0.0070 0.0062 0.0074 0.0038
( 0.0422) ( 0.0517) ( 0.0541) ( 0.0565) ( 0.0620)
Low Risk 0.0102 0.0079 0.0081 0.0058 0.0053
( 0.0428) ( 0.0574) ( 0.0626) ( 0.0629) ( 0.0588)
High-Low -0.0036 -0.0021 -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0075
( 0.0316) ( 0.0357) ( 0.0395) ( 0.0372) ( 0.0513)
32Table 13: Estimation of Shumway model, ﬁnancial ﬁrms
Standard Wald
Parameter Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -10.1012 0.6485 242.6329 <.0001
NITA -3.5996 1.0809 11.091 0.0009
TLTA -0.2326 0.2759 0.7111 0.3991
ExRET -1.7458 0.1921 82.5879 <.0001
Sigma 8.0392 0.7306 121.0837 <.0001
RSize -0.6591 0.0495 177.4241 <.0001
33Table 14: Summary Statistics of explanatory variables, ﬁnancial
ﬁrms
Panel A: All Observations
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
NITA 20485 0.015963 0.037423 -0.1563 0.186411
TLTA 20485 0.830259 0.173737 0.133926 0.971224
ExRET 20485 1.04591 0.359443 0.26314 2.354572
RSize 20485 -8.72666 2.048475 -12.7093 -4.06394
Sigma 20485 0.094877 0.056167 0.02437 0.359719
CASHTA 20217 0.101728 0.115157 0.002077 0.625715
BM 20444 0.864317 0.547656 0.036893 3.450739
CR 1770 2.373825 2.572627 0.230239 18.08202
Panel B: Firms in Distress the Following Year
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
NITA 301 -0.02483 0.073507 -0.1563 0.186411
TLTA 301 0.764391 0.231594 0.133926 0.971224
ExRET 301 0.670708 0.413134 0.26314 2.354572
RSize 301 -11.189 1.572742 -12.7093 -5.31709
Sigma 301 0.18686 0.104406 0.02437 0.359719
CASHTA 301 0.135756 0.156692 0.002077 0.625715
BM 301 1.083676 0.908897 0.036893 3.450739
CR 54 2.676117 3.429431 0.230239 18.08202
Panel C: Firms in Healthy Condition the Following Year
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
NITA 20184 0.016572 0.036274 -0.1563 0.186411
TLTA 20184 0.831242 0.172545 0.133926 0.971224
ExRET 20184 1.051505 0.35561 0.26314 2.354572
RSize 20184 -8.68994 2.032312 -12.7093 -4.06394
Sigma 20184 0.093505 0.05396 0.02437 0.359719
CASHTA 19916 0.101213 0.114342 0.002077 0.625715
BM 20143 0.861039 0.539792 0.036893 3.450739
CR 1716 2.364312 2.541727 0.230239 18.08202
34Table 15: Portfolios sorted by size
and distress risk, Financial Firms
Panel A. Full Sample
Big Small
High Risk 0.0057 0.0101
( 0.0688) ( 0.0876)
Mid Risk 0.0096 0.0132
( 0.0631) ( 0.0626)
Low Risk 0.0087 0.0132
( 0.0620) ( 0.0544)
High-Low -0.0030 -0.0031
( 0.0420) ( 0.0632)
Panel B. High SMB regime
Big Small
High Risk 0.0097 0.0224
( 0.0634) ( 0.0950)
Mid Risk 0.0121 0.0193
( 0.0590) ( 0.0590)
Low Risk 0.0088 0.0182
( 0.0580) ( 0.0499)
High-Low 0.0009 0.0042
( 0.0400) ( 0.0729)
Panel C. Low SMB regime
Big Small
High Risk 0.0027 0.0007
( 0.0725) ( 0.0804)
Mid Risk 0.0077 0.0086
( 0.0661) ( 0.0649)
Low Risk 0.0086 0.0094
( 0.0650) ( 0.0574)
High-Low -0.0059 -0.0087
( 0.0433) ( 0.0541)
35Table 16: Risk Premium Estimates. Panel A reports the price of risk estimated with no
intercept term in the cross-sectional regression. Panel B displays the estimation with
intercept term in the cross-sectional regression. We also present both sum beta on the left
and tradition simple beta on the right. t-values are in the parentheses.
Panel A: No intercept in cross-sectional regression
Sum Beta Approach Simple Beta Approach
CAPM FF3 CAPM FF3
MKTRF 0.0048 0.0031 0.0048 -0.0078 MKTRF 0.0051 0.0039 0.0048 -0.0102
(2.27) (1.20) (2.31) (-2.64) (2.30) (1.16) (2.38) (-2.94)
SMB 0.0020 0.0053 SMB 0.0022 0.0062
(1.37) (3.46) (1.40) (3.62)
HML -0.0024 0.0025 HML -0.0030 0.0027
(-1.12) (1.22) (-1.47) (1.28)
ODDS -0.0003 -0.0016 ODDS -0.0002 -0.0018
(-1.31) (-5.32) (-0.70) (-5.21)
Panel B: Intercept term included in cross-sectional regression
Sum Beta Approach Simple Beta Approach
CAPM FF3 CAPM FF3
Intercept 0.0062 0.0174 0.0154 0.0063 Intercept 0.0081 0.0163 0.0160 0.0043
(2.11) (3.37) (5.26) (1.00) (2.28) (3.38) (5.04) (0.68)
MKTRF -0.0003 -0.0048 -0.0099 -0.0091 MKTRF -0.0020 -0.0057 -0.0105 -0.0109
(-0.08) (-1.53) (-2.93) (-2.92) (-0.44) (-1.73) (-2.89) (-3.15)
SMB 0.0014 0.0039 SMB 0.0015 0.0052
(0.98) (1.76) (0.93) (2.69)
HML -0.0004 0.0010 HML -0.0007 0.0018
(-0.20) (0.52) (-0.38) (0.71)
ODDS 0.0008 -0.0010 ODDS 0.0006 -0.0014
(1.81) (-1.34) (1.28) (-1.85)
36Table 17: The correlation coefﬁcients be-
tween factors
A. Full Sample (1963-2009)
SMB HML DISTRESS










MKTRF 0.2033 -0.3618 0.1774
SMB -0.3722 0.7641
HML -0.2481
The correlation coefﬁcients between
factors in different sample periods are
shown in this table.
37Table 18: GMM Estimation of Competing Models
CAPM CAPM and Distress Risk FF-3 Model FF-3 and Distress Risk
Full 1963-82 1982-09 Full 1963-82 1982-09 Full 1963-82 1982-09 Full 1963-82 1982-09
A. Coefﬁcient:
CONST 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.02 1.04 1.05 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.09 1.06
t-value (154.57) (200.39) (94.50) (140.59) (56.01) (69.40) (50.58) (34.44) (35.35) (48.71) ( 27.51) (35.17)
MKTRF -1.58 -1.39 -1.63 -1.47 -0.12 -2.13 -3.25 -1.29 -4.41 -3.26 -0.92 -4.35
t-value ( -1.66) (-1.13) (-1.32) (-1.52) (-0.09) (-1.82) (-2.88) (-0.95) (-2.67) (-2.87) ( -0.64) (-2.64)
SMB -1.19 -4.20 2.43 -1.02 -10.90 1.37
t-value (-0.84) (-1.72) ( 1.26) (-0.34) ( -1.23) ( 0.45)
HML -7.33 -8.65 -7.48 -7.30 -10.20 -7.47
t-value (-4.00) (-3.06) (-2.92) (-3.81) ( -3.03) (-2.92)
DISTRESS -0.59 -2.92 2.64 -0.10 3.11 0.85
t-value (-0.88) (-2.76) (2.69) (-0.07) ( 0.75) ( 0.48)
B. Premium:
MKTRF 0.0032 0.0027 0.0034 0.0034 0.0033 0.0029 0.0039 0.0023 0.0046 0.0039 0.0021 0.0043
t-value ( 1.66) (1.13) (1.32) (1.73) (1.37) (1.18) (1.82) (0.92) (1.57) (1.80) (0.80) (1.43)
SMB 0.0009 0.0045 -0.0040 0.0009 0.0049 -0.0044
t-value (0.64) (2.17) (-2.29) (0.65) (2.30) (-2.31)
HML 0.0046 0.0054 0.0059 0.0046 0.0055 0.0059
t-value (3.29) (2.79) (3.29) (3.25) (2.83) (3.29)
DISTRESS 0.0039 0.0126 -0.0117 0.0033 0.0107 -0.0081
t-value (1.23) (2.96) (-2.42) (0.88) (2.38) (-1.43)
C. Model Diagnostics:
J-Stat 44.50 23.75 42.78 43.87 20.79 39.88 35.04 16.33 37.42 35.03 15.85 37.09
p-value (0.00) (0.42) (0.01) (0.00) (0.53) (0.01) (0.03) (0.75) (0.02) (0.02) (0.73) (0.01)
HJ Dist 0.35 0.39 0.51 0.35 0.36 0.51 0.30 0.31 0.49 0.30 0.29 0.48
p-value (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.45) (0.00) (0.00) (0.53) (0.00)
Delta-J 0.64 3.31 8.98
p-value (0.43) (0.07) (0.00)
D. Factor Statistics:
Full Sample 1963-1982 1982-2009
MKTRF (t-value) 4.65 (0.66) 1.59 (1.01) 6.80 (0.88)
SMB (t-value) 2.99 (0.47) 5.63 (0.71) 1.13 (0.62)
HML (t-value) 4.82 (0.43) 6.02 (0.60) 3.97 (0.60)
DISTRESS (t-value) 0.94 (1.01) 8.16 (1.50) -4.15 (1.36)
This table reports results of asset pricing tests on our sample. Robust p-values are in round brackets. The J-test
is the over-identifying restriction test of Hansen (1982). HJ-distance refers to the distance metric of Hansen and
Jagannathan (1997). The delta-J test of ? assesses whether the inclusion of HML and SMB improves model ﬁt. A
small p-value for the delta-J test indicates that additional factors improve model ﬁt.
The distress risk factor is the return difference between a high risk portfolio and low risk portfolio. We sort all ﬁrms
in June each year according to their respective distress risk and form 5 quintile portfolios with same number of ﬁrms
in each of them. The portfolios with top 20% and bottom 20% of distress risk probabilities are used to calculate the
distress risk factor. All portfolios are value weighted.
The sample period is from July 1963 to June 2009. We further divide the sample into two subperiods, July 1963 to
June 1982 and July 1982 to June 2009.
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